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ACT, INTENTION, AND MOTIVE IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW
In the Return of Sherlock Holmes we are told of an "attempt
to murder Mr. Sherlock Holmes" under the following circumstances. Holmes expected that an attempt on his life would be
made by Colonel Moran. He therefore prepared a wax figure
of himself. This he put in a life-like position in the armchair
in his room. The window-shade was pulled down and a strong
light placed so as to throw the silhouette of the figure onto the
shade. The more completely to carry out the deception, Holmes
arranged with his landlady to move the figure from time to
time so as to give it an appearance of life, of course keeping
herself concealed and out of range of possible bullets. Thus
arranged, the figure offered a tempting target. Holmes and
the faithful Watson concealed themselves in an empty house
across the street and patiently awaited developments. As luck
would have it, Colonel Moran chose the same house and room
as the place from which to attack Holmes, and fired from a
window of the house. The bullet struck the wax figure in the
forehead. The Colonel was immediately seized and placed under
arrest. The police proposed to prosecute him for "the attempted
murder of Mr. Sherlock Holmes." Unfortunately for us the
culprit was held for the previous murder of another person and
was never brought to trial upon the charge of attempt to murder.
If this charge had been pressed, upon proof of the facts stated
above, could the accused have been convicted of a criminal attempt
to murder Holmes? Would it have been different if the windowshade had been up and the figure itself, instead of the silhouette,
had been visible to the Colonel? That there should be any doubt
that in both cases Colonel Moran was guilty of a criminal
attempt to murder Holmes would probably surprise a layman,
but a consideration of the authorities upon attempts--or at least
of the opinions of some of the judges and legal authors who
have written upon the question-tends to throw doubt upon the
matter. Indeed, if we apply tests which have occasionally been
suggested it would seem that in the first case the accused was
guilty, but that in the second case he was not guilty, of a
criminal attempt to murder.'
'See the opinion by Bartlett, J., in People v. Jaffe (i9o6) 185 N. Y. 497
and the discussion of Criminal Attempts by Professor Joseph H. Beale
in (1903) i6 HAv. L. REv. 491.
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In view of this confusion as to the tests by which we are to
determine whether or not a criminal attempt has been committed-a confusion which exists to some extent in the actual
decisions but to a greater extent, it is believed, in the opinions
of judges and the writings of legal authors-it is proposed to
examine anew the whole question. In undertaking to do this the
present writer does not cherish the illusion that a simple solution of this difficult problem can be found. It is, however, hoped
that an attempt at an analysis somewhat more careful than that
usually given will throw additional light upon the real problems
involved. Fully to accomplish the purpose in view will require
a preliminary discussion of a few of the more common terms
used in criminal law, as well as of the actual concepts which
underlie them. This will be undertaken in the present article.
A second article will be devoted to an analysis of criminal
attempts.
It is a common saying that every crime may be looked at as
composed of two elements: (I) an act and (2) the intention,
or state of mind with which the act is done.2 In connection
with the latter the question most commonly asked is, "Did or
did not the one who did the act intend to bring about the results
which actually took place? Was that his intention." However
simple and clear such statements and questions may appear to
be at first sight, a moment's reflection reveals that the two terms,
act and intention, are by no means free from ambiguity. One
writer or judge will use them in one sense, another in a different
sense; indeed, the same writer will not always be consistent in
his usage. We must, therefore, begin by noting the various
possible meanings which each of these terms may have-meanings more or less sanctioned by current modes of expression in
the legal world. When this has been done, we may perhaps be
'"The
intent and the act must concur to constitute the crime." Per
Lord Kenyon, C. 3., in Fowler v. Padget (1798) 7 T. T. a, 514. "To constitute a crime, there must, as a rule, be both a guilty mind and a criminal
act" Odgers, The Common Law of England, p. io6. "Every common
law crime consists of two elements: first the voluntary commission of
an act which is declared by the law to be criminal; second, the existence
in the offender of a state of mind which is declared by law to be con-

sistent with criminality."

May, Criminal Law (3d ed.) sec. 5. Some-

times intent is used; at other times, intention. Throughout the present
discussion the latter has been used. Both of these of course in many cases
are used as rmeaning merely -stateof mind, as for example, in the question,
"What was his intention?"
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in a position to give to each of these words some one particular
meaning which will be the most useful for the purposes of the
present discussion.
First then of the term act: no word is more commonly used by
judges and writers upon law, as a rule apparently without much
thought of any possible ambiguity. Legal literature is full of
phrases such as "the criminal act," "an act of homicide," "an act
of trespass," etc., etc. Let us analyze one of these phrases. Take,
for example, "an act of homicide." Suppose A murders B by
shooting him with a pistol. What is "the act?" The usual answer
would probably be, "the act of killing B." Even a brief consideration shows us that we have here a complex rather than a simple
thing; that if we are to use words in an accurate, scientific manner we must recognize that the term act is here used so as to
include more than one thing. Apparently it covers (i) what may
be called the act (or series of acts) in a narrow sense of the word,
i. e., a muscular movement (or movements) willed by the actor;
(2) some reference to the surrounding circumstances; (3) the
consequences or results of the movement (or movements). It
seems obvious that if we are to make any careful analysis, we
must distinguish between these three things; to do so, we need
to have separate names for them. Perhaps we. cannot do better
than to restrict the word act to the narrower sense above suggested, i. e., so that it means simply a muscular movement that
is willed. If we do this, we can say that in considering criminal
liability we have to consider (i) the act (or acts); (2) the
concomitant circumstances; (3) the consequences; (4) the actor's
state of mind at the time he acts with reference to these circumstances and consequences. In the concrete case which we
are considering, in this narrower sense of the word the acts of
A consist of a series of muscular movements willed by A. The
concomitant circumstances include, for example, the fact that
B was within range of the pistol; that the pistol was loaded,
etc., etc. The consequences of A's acts are of course very
numerous; some are, for example, the pistol is raised and turned
in B's direction; the trigger is pulled back; the hammer falls;
the powder is ignited and explodes; the bullet is expelled from
the pistol, goes through the air toward B, strikes the surface of
B's body and penetrates the same; as a result B's body undergoes physical changes which result in death. Strictly and scientifically, all these things and many others are not parts of A's
act but merely the consequences of the same. This use of the
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term act in this narrow sense is sanctioned by many of the most
eminent writers on jurisprudence. For example, Austin says:
"Most of the names which seem to be names of acts,
are names of acts, coupled with certain of their consequences. For example, If I kill you with a gun or pistol,
I shoot you: And the long train of incidents which are
denoted by that brief expression, are considered (or
spoken of) as if they constituted an act, perpetrated by
me. In truth, the only parts of the train which are my
act or acts, are the muscular motions by which I raise the
weapon; point it at your head or body, and pull the
trigger. These I will. The contact of the flint and steel;
the ignition of the powder, the flight of the ball towards
your body, the wound and subsequent death, with the
numberless incidents included in these, are consequences
of the act which I will. I will not those consequences,
although I may intend them." 3
Mr. Justice Markby takes the same view.

He says:

"I will analyse a little further the nature of an act. An
act is the bodily movement which follows immediately
upon a volition. What follows upon an act in connection with it are its consequences.
It is necessary to
remember this, although, in common language, we often
use the word 'act' to express both an act and its consequences; as, for example, when we speak of an act of
murder. Without a bodily movement no act can be done.
A silent and motionless man can only forbear." 4
Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes expresses his agreement
with this view in the following characteristically terse passage:
"An act is always a voluntary muscular contraction,
and nothing else. The chain of physical sequences which
it sets in motion or directs to the plaintiff's harm is no
part of it, and very generally a long train of such sequences
intervenes." 5
Often, however, as some of the phrases quoted above show,
the term act is used more loosely, and may be regarded as a
more or less convenient shorthand expression to describe not
'Jurisprudence (5th ed.) p.

415.
"Elements of Law (6th ed.) sec. 215.
a The Common Law, p. 91; cf. Stephan, General View of the Criminal
Law of England (2d ed.) pp. 68-69.
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only the act in this narrow sense but also some portion of the
accompanying circumstances as well as of the consequences.
For example, Mr. Solicitor General Salmond says:
"The term act is one of ambiguous import, being used
in various senses of different degrees of generality. When
it is said, however, that an act is one of the essential conditions of liability, we use the term in the widest sense of
which it is capable. We mean by it any event which is
subject to the control of the human will. Such a definition is, indeed, not ultimate, but it is sufficient for the
purpose of the law. As to the nature of the will and of
the control exercised by it, it is not for lawyers to dispute,
this being a problem of psychology or physiology, not of
jurisprudence ......
By some writers the term act is limited to that part of
the act which we have distinguished as its origin. According to this opinion the only acts, properly so called, are
movements of the body. 'An act,' it has been said, 'is
always a voluntary muscular contraction and nothing else.'

That is to say, the circumstances and consequences of an

act are not part of it, but are wholly external to it. This
limitation, however, seems no less inadmissible in law
than contrary to the common usagF of speech. We habitually and rightly include all material and relevant circumstances and consequences under the name of the act. The
act of the murderer is the shooting or poisoning of his
victim, not merely the muscular contractions by which
this result is effected. To trespass on another man's
land is a wrongful act; but the act includes the circumstance that the land belongs to another man, no less
than the bodily movements by which the trespasser enters
upon it."6

It is believed by the present writer that in a careful analysis
of legal responsibility the less wide meaning given to act by the
writers first quoted is preferable to this looser usage. The suggestion of Salmond that so to limit the word is to run counter
to accepted usage seems incorrect, except in so far as that is
"Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th ed.) pp. 323, 326. This loose use of
the word act is of course common in judicial opinions as well as in
popular language. "Where a man stands on the New York side of the
[State] line, aVpd shooting across the border, kills one in New Jersey
. . . the blow is in fact struck in New Jersey. It is the defendant's act
in this state [New Jersey]. The passage of the ball, after it crosses the
boundary, and its actual striking, is the continuous act of the defendant."
Vrendenburgh, J., in State v. Carter (1859) 3 Dutch. (N. J. L.) 499.
Cf. the opinion of Garoutte, J., in People v. Botkin (igoi) x32 Cal. 231.
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involved in all attempts to limit to one meaning a word which
in popular speech has more than one.
The difficulties involved in the broader use of the term are
shown by the following passage from Salmond which follows
immediately that quoted above:
"It may be suggested that althoigh an act must be taken
to include some of its consequences, it does not include
all of them, but only those which are direct or immediate.
Any such distinction, however, between direct and indirect,
proximate and remote consequences, is nothing more than
an indeterminate difference of degree, and cannot be made
the basis of any logical definition. The distinction between an act and its consequences, between doing a thing
and causing a thing, is a merely verbal one; it is a matter
of convenience of speech, and not the product of any
scientific analysis of the conception involved. There is
no logical distinction between the act of killing a man
and the act of doing something which results (however
remotely) in his death." 7
This leads us into this difficulty: the death of the victim is not
the last consequence of the act; an infinite series of more remote
consequences follows. As a farther result, for example, the
victim's family was starved to death because of non-support,
etc., etc. Are all these "logically" parts of "the act" as thus
defined? Is it really intended to include under act all the consequences, however remote, of a voluntary muscular movement?
If so, all that can be said is that even popular language does not
go so far, and there seems to be no utility in so extending the
meaning of the word. Indeed, the difficulties into which we fall
if we use act in this wider sense could not be more clearly illustrated than by the passage just quoted. "The distinction between
an act and its consequences .......
is a merely verbal one,"
says the learned author, adding in explanation: "There is no
logical distinction between the act of killing a man and the act of
doing something which results (however remotely) in his death.""
This is quite true if we use act to include consequences, but not
if we use it in the narrow and more accurate sense of a muscular movement that is willed. The distinction between that and
its consequences in the outer world is not "merely verbal" but
a very important one in factY
Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th ed.) pp. 326, 327.

The italics are those of the present writer.
'It seems that the learned writer has used act in two senses in the

passage quoted.

If the "consequences"

are part of the "act," they
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To be sure, when no strict and accurate analysis is involved
there is perhaps no very serious objection to the rather loose
usage current among both laymen and lawyers, and it has a
certain convenience as a shorthand method of expression. The
moment, however, that we leave the field of loose discussion
and enter that of careful aAalysis, we need terms that express
distinctions which clearly do exist and must be taken account
of. For this reason in the present discussion the term act will
be used, unless otherwise indicated, to signify a muscular movement that is willed.
The broader meaning given to the word act by Mr. Salmond
is to be distinguished from the somewhat unusual one found
in the following passages taken from Professor Beale's discussions of "Recovery for the Consequences of an Act," and of
"Criminal Attempts."
"In all cases of personal injury or direct injury to
property, the act is the physical contact between the person
or property injured and the outside force. It is immaterial
which element of the combination is the active one. My
act is the same, whether I thrust a sharp stick into A,
or fix the stick, and cause A to run upon it; whether I
pour water over him, or cause him to jump into a river;
whether I pack him in ice and salt, or cause him to be
exposed to the freezing air; whether I throw him upon a
pile of bricks, or by -removing a staging cause a load
of bricks to fall upon him. My act in these cases is not
fastening the stick, inducing the man to jump, turning
him out of doors, or removing the staging; it is bringing into contact with the man's body the stick, water, cold
air, and bricks respectively. If I so negligently manage
a vessel of which I am master as to run down and sink
another vessel and drown a passenger in it, my act of
injury is not the mismanagement of my vessel, but the
fatal contact between the passenger and the ocean. My
negligence is important only in determining whether I am
responsible for that contact. . .....
"The defendant's act, in the first instance, consisted in
setting some force in motion; and we are to hold him
are not consequences of it ("the act"): The learned author recognizes
this when he says: "It is unfortunate that there is no recognized name
for the origin or initial stage of act, as contrasted with the totality of it.
Bentham calls the former the act and the latter the action. Principles,
ch. 8, sect. 2. Works, I. p. 40. But in common usage these two terms
are synonymous, and to use them in this special sense would only lead
to confusion." P. 326, note 2.
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responsible for the act of injury on the ground that this
force is a factor of the act ......
10
"An attempt may be described as an act regarded as
a step toward another act. .........
In investigating criminal attempt, therefore, we are to
consider, first, what was the intended result which is
regarded by the law as a criminal act; and secondly, what
has the defendant done as a step toward bringing about
that result.......
The point in the chain of results selected by the law as
the criminal act is the contact of the poison with the tissues of the body. The physical harm, not the death of
the victim, is the criminal act; the death, being subsequent, is, as we have seen, an immaterial factor in considering the attempt to commit the crime.
It is quite true that in the ordinary use of language a
man attempts to bring about results as well as to do acts;
that when a murderer in intention fires a pistol he is
attempting not only to put a bullet into the object aimed
at, but to cause the death of his intended victim, who
may be a hundred miles away. But attempt in that sense,
having a mere mental connection with the intended result,
is not the concern of the criminal law, which punishes
physical acts only."'1
Apparently act is here used, although not consistently, as
including merely one of the consequences of the muscular movement of the actor, exclusive of the real act (muscular movement)
itself. It is difficult to see why we should single out this particular physical consequence of the act (muscular movement that
is willed) and call it "the act," and treat the consequences which
follow as "consequences" of the (so-called) "act."
A few words must of course be said in explanation of what is
meant by saying that the muscular movement in order to be
called an act must be willed. For our purposes the analysis
presented in many of the standard treatises on jurisprudence
seems entirely sufficient, without any attempt to go into the more
philosophical aspects of the subject. Austin may be taken as
an example. He says:
"Certain parts of the human body obey the will.
Changing the expression, certain parts of our bodies move
"'Recovery for Consequences of an Act (1896) 9 HARv. L. REv. 82, 84.
The italics are those of the present writer.
'Criminal Attempts (i9o3) 16 HA.v. L. REv. 492, 493. The italics are
those of the present writer.

HeinOnline -- 26 Yale L.J. 652 1916-1917

ACT, INTENTION AND MOTIVE
in certain ways as soon as we will that they should. Or,
changing the expression again, we have the power of
moving, in certain ways, certain parts of our bodies.
Now these expressions, and others of the same import,
merely signify this:
Certain movements of our bodies follow invariably and
immediately our wishes or desires for those same movements: Provided, that is, that the bodily organ be sane,
and the desired movement be not prevented by an outward obstacle or hindrance. If my arm be free from
disease, and from chains or other hindrances, my arm
rises, as soon as I wish that it should. But if my arm be
palsied, or fastened down to my side, my arm will not
move, although I desire to move it..........
All that I am able to discover when I will a movement
of my body, amounts to this: I wish the movement. The
movement immediately follows my wish of the movement.
And when I conceive the wish, I expect that the movement
wished will immediately follow it. Any one may convince himself that this is the whole of the case, by carefully
observing what passes in himself, when he wills to move
any of the bodily organs which are said to obey the will,
or the power or faculty of willing."'12
On the same point Holland says:
"Any discussion on the nature of the faculty of will and
the mode of its exercise would here be out of place. We
may accept as sufficient for our purpose the definition of
an act of will as 'the psychical cause by which the motor
nerves are immediately stimulated,' or as, 'that inward
state which, as experience informs us, is always succeeded
by motion while the body is in its normal condition,' e. g.
is not paralysed.
If a movement is caused by physical compulsion, 'vis
absoluta,' as when the hand of a person is forcibly guided
in making a signature, there is no act, since will is absent.
But the will itself, being amenable to motives, may be
coerced by threats, 'metus,' 'vis compulsiva,' 'duress per
minas.' Here there is indeed an act but one which produces none or few of the legal consequences which it
would have produced had it been the result of free
volition."'1
Keeping in mind that in our discussion we are to distinguish
sharply between the act properly so-called, its concomitant cir-

Jurisprudence (5th ed.) VoL I, 411-412.
'Jurisprudence (ioth ed.) p. io3.
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cumstances, and the resulting consequences, we must now
examine these other elements more carefully. In order to determine the criminal responsibility of the actor, we must determine
what his state of mind with reference to these other elements
was. The most important problem in criminal law in this connection is whether the actor did or did not intend certain consequences to follow from his act or acts.' 4 Was it his intention to
produce them? At once we are confronted by the usual dilemma,
viz., that it is not clear without discussion just what these muchused words intend and intention mean. Do they, for example,
mean simply that when he acted the actor wished or desired these
consequences to follow and so did the act in order that they
might so follow? Some writers seem to think so; for example,
Mr. Justice Markby says:
"Intention, then, is the attitude of mind in which the
doer of an act adverts to a consequence of the act and
desires it to follow. But the doer of an act may advert
to a consequence and yet not desire it: and therefore not
intend it."'"
At first thought one is inclined to agree with this, but once
again a little reflection tends to throw doubt upon the matter.
The problem may perhaps best be treated by the consideration
of concrete cases. (i) Suppose, as one case, that B is standing near a target at which A wishes to shoot. A realizes that if
he attempts to hit the target he will be about as likely to hit B
as to hit the target: nevertheless he fires, wishing to hit the
target, but hoping, indeed, that he will not hit B. If B is hit,
shall we say that A intended to hit B., i. e., that that consequence
which actually did follow A's act was intended by him? Was
it his intention to produce that consequence?
Mr. Justice
Markby of course would say "No"; Austin with equal promptness would say "Yes." He says:
"You shoot at Sempronius or Styles, at Titius or Nokes,
desiring and intending to kill him. The death of Styles
"
complete discussion of criminal liability would require of course a
discussion of consequences not intended, and of what is meant by negligence, heedlessness, rashness, etc. For a discussion of criminal attempts,
however, it will be sufficient to obtain an accurate notion of what we
mean when we say that the actor intended certain consequences to follow
from his act.
" Markby, Elements of Law (6th ed.) sec. 22o.
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is the end of your volition 4nd act. Your desire of his
death, is the ultimate motive to the volition. You contemplate his death, as the probable consequence of the act.
But when you shoot at Styles, I am talking with him,
and am standing close by him. And from the position in
which I stand with regard to the person you aim at, you
think it not unlikely that you may kill me in your attempt
to kill him. You fire, and kill me accordingly. Now here
you intend my death, without desiring it. The end of the
volition and act, is the death of Styles. My death is
neither desired as an end, nor is it desired as a mean: My
death subserves not your end: you are not a bit nearer
to the death of Styles, by killing me. But, since you conact,
template my death as a probable consequence of your
1
you intend my death although you desire it not."'
Bentham apparently took the same view, if we may judge from
the following passage:
"A consequence, when it is intentional, may either be
directly so, or only obliquely. It may be said to be
directly or lineally intentional, when the prospect of producing it constituted one of the links in the chain of
causes by which the person was determined to do the act.
It may be said to be obliquely or collaterally intentional,
when, although the consequence was in contemplation, and
appeared likely to ensue irl case of the act's being performed, yet the prospect of producing such consequence
did not constitute a link in the aforesaid chain. . . . He
[the actor] saw a stag running that way, and he saw the
king riding that way at the same time: what he aimed
at was to kill the stag: he did not wish to kill the king:
at the same time he saw, that if he shot, it was as likely
he should kill the king as the stag: yet for all that he
shot, and killed the king accordingly. In this case the
accident of his killing the king was intentional, but
obliquely so.'17
We thus find that usage is divided. Before making a choice
between the meanings suggested by the writers quoted, let us
note that other writers apparently have given a still different
significance to these words. (2) Take for example, as a second
case, the following state of facts: X wishes to kill A by blowing
him to pieces through exploding a stick of dynimite. B is
standing so near A that he also will necessarily, not merely
"Austin, Jurisprudence (5th ed.) Vol. I, p. 424.
' 7Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. viii.
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probably, be killed by the explosion. X, although he has no
ill-will toward B, and would be glad to spare him, nevertheless
explodes the dynamite in order to destroy A. Assuming that
X knew that the result necessarily would be the death of B as
well as of A, shall we say, when that result follows, that X
intended it? Did he intend to kill B as well as A? If so, can
we also truthfully say that X wvished or desired B's death, or
merely that, while he intended it, he did not wish or desire it?
Before giving a final answer to these questions let us consider
still another hypothetical case which will perhaps serve to reveal
more fully the shades of meaning which may be attached to the
word intend. (3) Suppose X wishes to kill A with a rifle bullet.
B is standing between X and A, so that the bullet from X's
rifle, if it is to reach A, must necessarily pass through B's body.
In spite of this, X aims and fires, and the bullet, pursuing the
course X wishes, passes through B's body before it strikes A.
Here clearly all would agree that X intended the bullet to go
through B's body, for only by having it do so could the purpose
for which he fired be accomplished. To be sure, he intended
this consequence to B only as a means to an end and not as an
end in itself, but that does not alter the fact that he actually
intended that it should happen.' 8
As already stated, our problem is chiefly one of choosing a
convenient terminology, i. e., one which will, on the whole, be
of the greatest aid to clear thinking and accurate analysis, and
at the same time be most nearly in accord with current usage,
so far at least as the latter is possible consistently with the former. For reasons which will perhaps reveal themselves as the
"I endeavour to explain what I mean, when I say, 'that a consequence
of an act may be wished as an end.' Strictly speaking, no external consequence of any act is desired as an end. The end or ultimate purpose
of every volition and act is a feeling or sentiment :-is pleasure, direct
or positive; or is the pleasure which arises indirectly from the removal
or prevention of pain. But where the pleasure, which (in strictness) is
the end of the act, can only be attained through a given external consequence, that external consequence is inseparable from the end; and is
styled (with sufficient precision) the end of the act and the volition.
For example, if you shoot me to death because you hate me mortally, my
death is a necessary condition to the attainment of your end. The end
of the act, is to allay the deadly antipathy. But the end can only be
attained through my death. And my death (which is an intended consequence of the act) may, therefore, be styled the end of the act and the
volition." Austin, Jurisprudence (5th ed.) Vol. 1, p. 422.
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discussion proceeds, it seems to the present writer desirable to
restrict the scope of the word intend more narrowly than does
Austin, but not quite so narrowly as does Markby. In doing
so we shall in substance follow Mr. Salmond's definition of
these terms. He says:
"Although nothing can be intended which is not desired,
it must be carefully noticed that a thing may be desired,
and therefore intended, not in itself or for its own sake,
but for the sake of something else with which it is necessarily connected. If I desire and intend a certain end, I
also desire and intend the means by which this end is to
be obtained, even though in themselves those means may be
indifferent, or even objects of aversion. If I kill a man
in order to rob him, I desire and intend his death, even
though I deeply regret, in his interests or in my own, the
necessity of it. In the same way, the desire and intention
of an end extend not merely to the means by which it is
obtained, but to all necessary concomitants without which
it cannot be obtained. If an anarchist, desiring to kill
the emperor, throws a -bomb into his carriage, knowing
that if it explodes and kills him it will also kill others who
are riding with him, the assassin both desires and intends
to kill those others: This additional slaughter may in
itself be in no way desired by him; he may be genuinely
sorry for it; yet it falls within the boundaries of his
desire and of his intent, since it is believed by him to be
a necessary concomitant of the end which he primarily
seeks. The deaths 'of the emperor and of the members
of his suite are inseparably connected, and they constitute,
therefore, a single issue which must be desired and
intended as a unity or not at all. When I know or believe
that A. cannot be had without B., I cannot say that I
intend A. but not B. If I desire A. sufficiently to overcome my aversion to B., then I desire the total issue of
which A. and B. are the two inseparable factors. With
respect to all circumstances which I know or believe to
exist, and with respect to all consequences which I know
or believe to be inevitable, my act is intentional, however
undesirable those circumstances or consequences may be in
themselves. I choose them deliberately and consciously
of that which I desire and intend
as necessary incidents
for its own sake."1
In accordance with this, we shall say that an actor intends a
particular consequence when either (i) he wishes or desires it to
happen as the result of the act which he does for the purpose of
Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th ed.) p. 337.
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bringing about the result in question; or (2) when at the time
he does the act he adverts to the consequence in question as one
which will necessarily result from the act, and this even if he
would be glad to have this particular consequence not happen
if he could avoid it and still bring about the consequence which
he has primarily in view. Using intend in this sense, our three
hypothetical cases may now be answered as follows. In the
first-where the consequence was adverted to as probable but
not as necessary-the actor neither desired nor intended the
consequence; he merely expected it, or had knowledge that it
would be likely to happen if he did the act. Mere expectation,
or knowledge by the actor that a given consequence will be likely
to happen as a result of his act is not the same as an intention
that it shall happen. In the second case-where he adverted
to the consequence as necessary and not merely as probable, but
would have been glad to avoid it if he could, and yet accomplish
his chief purpose-he intended the consequence although (it
seems) he did not really desire it. In the third case-that in
which the bullet had to go through B's body in order to strike
A-clearly the actor intended the consequence in question, and
perhaps-although that is more doubtful-desired it as well.
In making this choice in favor of a meaning narrower than
that given to this term by many writers, it is realized that the
wider meaning is not without its utility and to some extent more
in keeping with the habits of speech of many common-law judges
and writers. The common statement that a person is "presumed
by the law to intend the natural and probable consequence of his
acts" seems, at least in some cases, to be a somewhat loose way
of stating Austin's definition of intent. On the whole, however,
it is believed that the balance of convenience is against the wider
use of the term, as the narrower use here advocated compels us
to discriminate more carefully between states of mind that in
fact are different, and involve different legal consequences in
many cases.
Another word in common use in discussions of criminal law
is motive. Frequently it is contrasted with intention. For
example, Mr. Justice Stephen says:
"It is important to distinguish between motives and
intentions. An intention to do anything is consistent with
any number of different motives, and may remain unchanged while the motives vary. In the crime of pub-
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lishing a libel the intention must always be to give more
or less publicity to a certain libel. The motives for this
may be infinite, and may vary from time to time. So an
intention to kill may be the result of all sorts of motives.
It may be the act of an executioner, of a soldier in time
of war, of a man defending his own life, of a murderer.
The intent to kill is the same in all these and many other
cases. Intention is a much more definite thing than
motive, and is' ' 20 usually of much greater importance in
criminal cases.

To what extent is this distinction between motive and intention
as made by the learned author a sound one? Is the difference
fundamental or is motive merely a name for a certain kind of
intention? The latter seems to be the view of the author of
the following passage:
"A wrongful act is seldom intended and desired for its
own sake. The wrongdoer has in view some ulterior
object which he desires to obtain by means of it. The
evil which he does to another, he does and desires only
for the sake of some resulting good which he will obtain
for himself. He intends the attainment of this ulterior
object, no less than he intends the wrongful act itself.
His intent, therefore, is twofold, and is divisible into two
distinct portions, which we may distinguish as his immediate and his ulterior intent. The former is that which
relates to the wrongful act itself; the latter is that which
passes beyond the wrongful act, and relates to the object
or series of objects for the sake of which the act is done.
The immediate intent of the thief is to appropriate another
person's money, while his ulterior intent may be to buy
food with it or to pay a debt. The ulterior intent is called
the motive of the act.
The immediate intent is that part of the total intent
which is coincident with the wrongful act itself; the
ulterior intent or motive is that part of the total intent
which lies outside the boundaries of the wrongful act.
For just as the act is not necessarily confined within the
limits of the intent, so the intent is not necessarily confined within the limits of the act. The wrongdoer's immediate intent, if he has one, is his purpose to commit the
wrong; his ulterior intent, or motive is his purpose in
committing it. Every wrongful act may raise two distinct
questions with respect to the intent of the doer. The
first of these is: How did he do the act-Intentionally or
accidentally? The second is: If he did it intentionally,
Stephen, General View of the Criminal Law of England, p. 71.
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why did he do it? The first is an inquiry into his immediate intent; the second
is concerned with his ulterior
21
intent, or motive.1
Perhaps the matter may be stated somewhat as follows.
Nearly all consequences which are intended and desired by the
one whose act produces them are not desired for their own sake.
The actor has in view some farther, more remote consequence or
consequences which he is seeking to bring to pass by means of
these less remote, more immediate consequences. If, for example,
he deliberately inflicts injury upon another, he does so not because
he desires this injury as an end in itself, but for the sake of
some resulting good which he expects to obtain for himself. Inasmuch as he desires this more remote consequence to occur as
a result of his act, he intends it no less than he does the more
immediate consequences. His intention as well as his desire
therefore covers many consequences, some of which he desires
and intends as means for producing still farther consequences,
others as ends in themselves. When A for the purpose of killing B intentionally produces the consequence that a rifle bullet
strikes B's body, he both desires and intends not only that consequence but also many others, including the death of B. If he
is killing for revenge, he desires and intends all the foregoing
consequences as means to bring about the feeling of pleasure
which he expects to derive from B's death. He desires and
intends this feeling of pleasure to result from his act just as
much as he desires and intends the other consequences so to
result. The desire and intention to bring about this ulterior
consequence which is the end, rather than merely a means to an
end, seem to be what is meant in many cases by motive. In the
case put, it would probably be said by many that A's intention
was to kill B, but that his motive for so intending was to experience the pleasurable feeling which he expected would result
from the death of B. If A's object in killing B had been to
obtain B's money, it would be said that his intention was to
kill B, and that his motive was to obtain the money. In this
sense, therefore, motive seems to be merely a name for the desire
coupled with the intention to bring about a certain consequence
'Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th ed.) pp. 338-339. The learned reader
will note that in this passage the word act is used by the learned author

with the broader meaning which he prefers to give to it.
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as an end,22 by means of other consequences which are also
desired and intended but only as means. 23
Inasmuch as-according to the definition of those terms which
we have adopted-a consequence may be intended although perhaps not, strictly speaking, desired, it seems inaccurate to speak
of motive as being the ulterior intention merely, without coupling with it the desire as well. That is, if the intention is simply
to produce a consequence not desired but merely contemplated
as one that will necessarily result from the act and certain of
its consequences, obviously an intention of this kind can not be
called the motive with which the act is done and the earlier
consequences produced. The important element clearly is the
desire, and not merely the intention, to produce the ulterior
consequence.
If motive is merely a name for a certain kind of desire and
intention, can we accept without qualification the statement of
Mr. Justice Stephen above quoted, to the effect that "intention
is usually of much greater importance than motive in criminal
law?" May it not turn out to be true that in many cases whether
a crime has been committed will depend upon the motive with
which the acts that have produced certain results were done?
For example, intentional homicide may be either lawful or unlawful. If one kills merely for revenge or in order to obtain
property, the crime of murder is committed; if, on the other hand
the killing is done in the due execution of a sentence of death
upon a convicted criminal, or, under proper circumstances, for
the prevention of felony or in defense of oneself, the homicide is
lawful. Can we say in these cases that the lawfulness or unlawfulness depends upon the motive, i. e., the desire and intentiont "End" is here used as including both the internal consequence
which is, strictly speaking, the end, and the external consequence without which the internal could not be obtained. Compare note 18, supra.
"Frequently of 'course motive is used as the name for the external
object desired, rather than for the desire itself. Cf. Bentham, op. cit.
chap. X. It seems also that, at least occasionally, the desire and intention to produce an ulterior consequence which is not the ultimate consequence sought is called the motive with which a prior consequence
was produced. For example, it may be said that my motive in pulling
the trigger of a rifle is the desire and intention to cause the powder to
explode, or the bullet to leave the barrel of the rifle. At times also
purpose is used apparently as a synonym for motive. In the passage
quoted above from Mr. Salmond, it is said: "His ulterior intent, or
motive is his purpose in committing it."
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for example, to prevent a felony or to defend oneself? If so,
it would follow that although there may exist all the external
circumstances which would justify one in killing to prevent felony
or in self-defense, he would still be guilty of murder, if he
should kill solely for revenge and not with the motive (desire and
intention) to save his life or to stop the commission of the
felony. It would of course be difficult, if not impossible, to
prove that revenge was the motive in such a case, and it is not
surprising therefore that authorities expressly passing upon the
question are difficult to find. Many dicta, however, if not
decisions, indicate that this is the true view of the law.24

It is

also implied in the usual statements of the rule governing these
situations. For example, in his Digest of the Criminal Law
Mr. Justice Stephen states these rules as follows:
"The intentional infliction of death or bodily harm is
not a crime when it is done by any person in order to
prevent the commission of treason, murder, etc., . . . [or]

when it is inflicted
by any person in order to defend
' 25

himself, etc.

As previously stated, the foregoing discussion is intended not
as a complete analysis for the whole field of criminal law, but
merely as a foundation for the discussion of criminal attempts
which will be undertaken in a second article. At many points
it has therefore intentionally been left incomplete. For example,
the discussion of the various meanings of intend and intention
deals only with the simpler aspects of the problem and does not
raise the most difficult questi6ns which demand solution in a
study of criminal attempts. This is due to the fact that it was
assumed that exactly the consequences desired and intended by
the actor were actually caused by the act. The word attempt
4People v. Williams (1867) 32 Cal. 280; Worthan v. Georgia (1883)
7o Ga. 336; Lyons v. The State (i8gi) 1.37
Ill. 6o2. The following passage from the opinion of Lumpkin, J., in Golden v. The Sthte (1858) 25
Ga. 527, is apparently contra: "Whenever the circumstances of the-killing
would not amount to murder, the proof even of express malice will not
make it so. One may harbor the most intense hatred toward another;
he may court an opportunity to take his life; may rejoice while he is
imbruing his hands in his heart's blood; and yet, if, to save his own
life, the facts showed that he was fully justified in slaying his adversary,
his malice shall not be taken into the account. This principle is too
plain to need amplification."
' (6th ed.), Articles 220, 221. The italics are those of the present writer.
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itself, however, indicates that for some reason or other all the
consequences desired and intended were not produced, or, as it
is commonly put, that the "completed crime was not committed."
In the belief that this phase of the matter can be most conveniently treated in dealing with concrete cases of alleged
attempts, a complete analysis has not been attempted in this
general preliminary survey, but will be undertaken later in the
second and more concrete part of the discussion.
WALTER WHEELER COOK.
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